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PERSONS
Katherine Shaw Spaht*

LEGISLATION

Wife's Obligation to Follow Her Husband
Two related Civil Code articles were affected by the Louisiana

legislature in 1985; one was repealed and the other amended, in part
because of concerns over constitutionality. Civil Code article 120 which
obligated the wife to follow her husband and reside with him where he
chose to live and which reciprocally obligated the husband to support
his wife according to his means and condition' was eliminated as a legal
obligation imposed on spouses by marriage. Since the obligation of the
wife to follow her husband was the foundation for the rule that the
domicile of a married woman is that of her husband, 2 article 39 was
amended as well to delete that clause.
Both articles 39 and 120 had been subject to constitutional scrutiny.
In Crosby v. Crosby,3 a constitutional challenge to article 120 was raised
in the context of the wife's fault which would bar a claim for permanent
alimony. 4 The only evidence of the wife's fault had been her refusal to
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Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
I. The burden imposed upon the husband under this article was more onerous than
the obligation of each spouse to support the other under Civil Code article 119. Article
120 imposed upon the husband the obligation "to furnish her [his wife] with whatever
is required for the convenience of life, in proportion to his means and condition." In
R. Pascal and K. Spaht, Louisiana Family Law Course 122 (3rd ed. 1982), the authors
observe:
The obligation is greater than that imposed by Article 119 in that the husband
must furnish the wife with the conveniences of life, not merely the necessities
of life, and to an extent proportionate to his means and condition. Condition
here must be taken to refer to his position in society; means must be understood
as his state of material fortune. As a matter of legal rule, then, both the
husband's means and his social position must be taken into consideration in
appraising his special obligation of support toward his wife.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 39: "A married woman has no other domicile than that of
her husband; the domicile of a minor not emancipated is that of his father, mother, or
tutor; a person of full age, under interdiction, has his domicile with his curator."
3. 434 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
4. La. Civ. Code art. 160.
*
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follow her husband.' On appeal, the wife raised the constitutionality of
article 120 for the first time, 6 and alternatively, she claimed other valid
reasons for failing to follow her husband. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal held article 120 unconstitutional under both the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of
the Louisiana Constitution. The article discriminated against women,
according to the court, "by arbitrarily forcing them to follow husbands
wherever they chose to live. . . .'" The court added, "[Wie cannot
envision any 'important governmental objectives' served by Art. 120."1
In the opinion, the court of appeal cited an earlier Louisiana Supreme
Court decision, Craig v. Craig9 declaring Civil Code article 39, which
makes the domicile of a married woman that of her husband, unconstitutional.
In the Craig case, however, article 39 was declared unconstitutional
only for the purpose of the mandatory venue for separation and divorce
suits under the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 3941 provides that the
proper venue for a separation or divorce action is the parish where
either party is domiciled, or the parish of the spouses' last matrimonial
domicile, and that the venue is non-waivable.10 The issue posed for
resolution in Craig was "whether article 39 is unconstitutional either

5. La. Civ. Code arts. 138(5), 143-45. If the wife refused to follow her husband
and reside where he chose, she was guilty of abandonment unless she could prove lawful
cause. See Smith y. Smith, 148 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), writ refused, 244
La. 143, 150 So. 2d 767 (1963). See also Callahen v. Callais, 224 La. 901, 71 So. 2d
320 (1954); Glorioso v. Glorioso, 223 La. 357, 65 So. 2d 794 (1953).
6. In Craig v. Craig, 365 So. 2d 1298, 1299 n.5 (La. 1978), the court observes:
In Johnson v. Welch, 334 So. 2d 395 (La. 1976) we held that the court of
appeal improperly held article 39 unconstitutional as it applied to article 3941
of the Code of Civil Procedure because the constitutionality of article 39 had
not been attacked by the pleadings in the trial court and, therefore, the question
of its constitutionality was not properly before that court. In addition, we noted
that the court of appeal's determination of unconstitutinality was contrary to
the settled judicial practice of declining to determine the constitutionality of
laws unless such a determination was necessary for disposition of the cause. In
Johnson, a determination of unconstitutionality was not necessary for disposition
of the cause because we found from a review of the record that the husband's
misconduct was sufficient to justify the wife in establishing a separate domicile.
In the instant case, the constitutionality of article 39, as applied to article 3941
of the Code of Civil Procedure, was attacked by the pleadings in the trial court
and the stipulation entered into between the parties precludes a finding that the
wife was justified in establishing a separate domicile.
7. 434 So. 2d 162, 163 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
8. Id.
9. 365 So. 2d 1298 (La. 1978).
10. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3941: "The venue provided in this article may not be
waived, and a judgment rendered in any of these actions by a court of improper venue
is an absolute nullity."
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under the state or federal constitutions, insofar as it enables a husband,
but not a wife, to establish a separate domicile and there bring an
action for annulment of marriage, separation from bed and board, or
divorce."" The discriminatory treatment of husbands and wives, by the
application of Civil Code article 39 in combination with Code of Civil
Procedure article 3941, was without a legitimate purpose, according to
the supreme court. The court specifically rejected the reasoning of the
court of appeal that the classification was adopted "as part of the
overall 'pattern of laws designed to protect the marriage, home and
family.""' 2 The sole effect of the two articles was to give the husband
a "procedural advantage" in an action for separation. Furthermore, the
right of the wife to establish a domicile separate from her husband only
if she proved he was guilty of fault entitling her to a separation 3 "is
in no way reasonably related to the marital obligations mutually owed
by the husband and the wife or to the determination of which party
'4
prevails on the merits of the action.'
Initially, the repeal of Civil Code article 120 raises the question of
whether the law imposes any duty upon the spouses to live together,
the breach of which would entitle the other to a separation from bed
and board on the grounds of abandonment. There is no longer an
explicit legal obligation to live together; but Civil Code article 119
implicitly recognizes such a duty by imposing upon the spouses the
obligations of support and assistance," which ordinarily require proximity
to fulfill. Thus, in the ordinary case where one spouse withdraws from
the common dwelling or one spouse excludes or expels the other from
the common dwelling, 6 the repeal of article 120 would not change the
result that these circumstances constitute abandonment. Absent proof
of lawful cause, the spouse who leaves or excludes or expels the other

!1. 365 So. 2d 1298, 1299 (La. 1978).
12. Id. at 1300. The court of appeal opinion in Craig v. Craig is reported at 359
So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
13. Johnson v. Welch, 334 So. 2d 395 (La. 1976); Berry v. Berry, 310 So. 2d 626
(La. 1975); Bush v. Bush, 232 La. 747, 95 So. 2d 298 (1957).
14. 365 So. 2d 1298, 1300 (La. 1978).
15. R. Pascal & K. Spaht, supra note 1, at 121:
Traditionally, assistance includes at last the help or care of an ill or infirm
spouse. This is the way in which Planiol construes the identical article of the
French Code Civil ....
It should be construed to include more than such care.
The tasks of each spouse, to the extent he or she may not accomplish them
alone, are also the tasks of the other, to the extent he or she can be of
assistance, in the cooperative society of marriage. (citation omitted).
16. Schirrmann v. Schirrmann, 436 So. 2d 1340 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983); O'Pry v.
O'Pry, 425 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983); Lo Coco v. Lo Coco, 420 So. 2d 459
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Burnett v. Burnett, 349 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977);
Robertson v. Robertson, 332 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
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violates his implicit obligation to live with the other spouse to the extent
7
necessary to fulfill the obligations of support and assistance.1
In cases where one spouse has left the common dwelling for professional advancement, however, the repeal of article 120 makes identification of the abandoning spouse more difficult. Before the repeal, if
the husband moved for reasons of professional advancement and the
wife refused to follow, she was the spouse who quit the matrimonial
domicile. Absent proof of conduct sufficient to constitute grounds for
separation or divorce,'" the wife was guilty of abandonment. Likewise,
if the wife moved for economic or professional reasons and the husband
refused to follow, she was the spouse who had quit the matrimonial
domicile and again bore the burden of proving she did so with lawful
cause. With the repeal of article 120, the task of identifying the spouse
who quit the common dwelling, for the purpose of examining his or
her motives for doing so, becomes more difficult. Is the abandoning
spouse the one who moved for professional reasons or the one who
refused to follow? Such a factual situation should be regarded as an
instance in which there is an explicit or implicit agreement to live separate
and apart,' 9 and thus should not be considered abandonment, which
would allow either spouse a separation from bed and board z° or divorce
2
only after having lived separate and apart for one year. '
The amendment to Civil Code article 39 may have more significant
impact because of its effect on such procedural issues as venue. With
the elimination of the clause specifying that a married woman's domicile
is that of her husband, the wife's domicile is proved by residence in
22
fact coupled with an intention to remain indefinitely or permanently.
Under Code of Civil Procedure article 42,23 once the wife has moved
to and lives in a parish different from that of her husband, the proper
venue for an action against her would be in the parish of her new
domicile. Proper venue as to an action instituted against the husband

17. La. Civ. Code arts. 143, 144.
18. For a current decision reviewing the jurisprudence in this area, see Durand v.
Willis, 470 So. 2d 947 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985). See also, Laurent v. Laurent, 347 So.
2d 312 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Burnett v. Burnett, 324 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1975).
19. Sykes v. Sykes, 321 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975). But see criticism of
Sykes in Durand v. Willis, supra.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 138(9).
21. La. R.S. 9:301 (Supp. 1985).
22. La. Civ. Code arts. 38, 41-44.
23. La. Code Civ. P. art. 42: "The general rules of venue are that an action against:
(1) An individual who is domiciled in the state shall be brought in the parish of his
domicile; or if he resides but is not domiciled in the state, in the parish of his residence;
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would be in the parish of the old matrimonial domicile, where the
husband and wife lived together.
To illustrate the practical problems relating to venue which the
amendment to article 39 may make more frequent, consider the following
hypothetical: Wife contracts with C while a domiciliary of East Baton Rouge
Parish and while living with her husband. Subsequently, she separates form
her husband and moves to East Feliciana. Nine months later, C wishes to sue
to enforce the contractual obligation incurred by the wife. Code of Civil Procedure article 73524 makes either the husband or wife the proper party defendant in an action to enforce a community obligation.25
The proper venue for an action instituted against the husband, the noncontracting spouse, is East Baton Rouge Parish; however, the proper
venue for an action instituted against the wife is East Feliciana Parish.
Husband and wife are not solidary or joint obligors, such that Code
of Civil Procedure article 73 would permit an action to be instituted
against both in any parish of proper venue. 26 The only responsibility
incurred by the husband to the creditor is as to his undivided one-half
interest in community property. 27 The judgment to be obtained against
him is in rem, 281 not personal. In contrast, the responsibility of the wife
is personal, and her separate property and her interest in the community
may be seized in satisfaction of her obligation. If the creditor sues the
husband in East Baton Rouge Parish, as he may under Code of Civil
Procedure articles 42 and 735, must he institute a separate action against
the wife in East Feliciana?

24. La. Code Civ. P. art. 735:
Either spouse is the proper defendant, during the existence of the marital
community, in an action to enforce an obligation against community property;
however, if one spouse is the managing spouse with respect to the obligation
sought to be enforced against the community property, then that spouse is the
proper defendant in an action to enforce the obligation....
25. La. Civ. Code arts. 2360-63.
26. La. Civ. Code art. 2345: "A separate or community obligation may be satisfied
during the community property regime from community property and from the separate
property of the spouse who incurred the obligation." See also, La. Civ. Code art. 2346,
comment (b): "This provision does not make each spouse the mandatory [sic] of the other.
A spouse who contracts with a third person, when acting alone in the management of
community property, does not obligate the separate property of the other spouse ......
27. Id.
28. A case failing to recognize that the judgment is in rem and why it is important
was Williams v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, No. 79-3185 (E.D. La., March 11, 1981),
discussed in Note, Termination of the Community, 42 La. L. Rev. 789, 798 n.51 (1982).
For a later decision which fails to articulate the nature of the judgment yet reaches the
right result, see Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Nata, 469 So. 2d 11 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
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It may be useful under the hypothetical facts outlined above to
develop the notion of ancillary venue of partie&to permit the
creditor
to sue both husband and wife in either parish. Ancillary venue as to
claims has been recognized, although not by name, in a series of courts
of appeal decisions.2 9 In those cases the issue concerned two claims
against the same defendant arising out of the same factual pattern, but
with different venues. In Albritton v. McDonald,30 the court opined:
We agree with the holding in Smith that where a plaintiff has
the right to institute an action on two or more claims arising
out of one factual circumstance and that where venue is proper
as to one claim, the disposition of which would affect the second
claim as to which, if standing alone, venue might not be proper,
the court has the venue of the action to decide both claims in
the interest of efficient judicial administration, and the court
therefore should overrule an exception to the venue.'
The same laudable goals of judicial efficiency and consistency in
judgments can be accomplished in the hypothetical situation by adopting
the concept of ancillary venue of parties. It involves one claim against
two parties arising out of one factual circumstance. The Code of Civil
Procedure adopts this concept in article 73 by permitting solidary obligors
to be sued in any parish where venue is proper as to one of them. The
redactors of the Code of Civil Procedure could not foresee that with
matrimonial regimes reform a spouse might be responsible to a creditor
only to the extent of his interest in community property; and furthermore, that either spouse would be the proper party defendant in an
action to enforce a community obligation.
Although the amendment to Civil Code article 39 did not create
the problem of different venues for suits against two parties arising out
of the same factual circumstance,3 2 it may increase the frequency of
such problems. Absent legislative attention to the articles that specify
the venue for actions, the concept of ancillary venue of parties may
prove useful in resolving the potential problems that the amendment to
article 39 has exacerbated.

29. Albritton v. McDonald, 363 So. 2d 925 (La. App, 2d Cir. 1978), writ refused,
366 So. 2d 561 (La. 1979); Smith v. Baton Rouge Bank and Trust Co., 286 So. 2d 394
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
30. 363 So. 2d 925 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), writ refused, 366 So. 2d 561 (La. 1979).
31. Id.at 928.
32. Problems existed without the amendment if the wife could prove that she was
living separate and apart from her husband due to fault on his part sufficient to entitle
her to a separation and divorce. See cases cited supra at note 18.
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Reestablishment of the Community by Reconciliation
Although it has been observed that the comprehensive matrimonial
regimes legislation of 197931 failed to remedy the problems resulting

from the requirement of an authentic act to reestablish the community
upon reconciliation of the spouses,3" the Legislature did respond by
amending Louisiana Civil Code article 155. 31 In fact it was scholarly
criticism of the inability to reestablish the community upon reconciliation
that originally led to the amendment to article 155 in 1943. This amendment permitted a matrimonial agreement to be executed by the spouses.
Requiring a matrimonial agreement of the spouses was, however, only
an alternative suggestion. Professor Harriet S. Daggett originally proposed that "the community be not dissolved by judgment of separation
of bed and board in cases where reconciliation has taken place." 3' 6 Even
then, Professor Daggett foresaw the shortcomings of her alternative
proposal for those spouses who were unaware of the remedy provided
37
by the matrimonial agreement.
This all too familiar scenario has been repeated many times since
1943: husband and wife reconcile after a judgment of separation and

years later discover that, with one notable exception, the reconciliation
terminated the effects of the judgment.38 Contrary to what the ordinary
33. 1979 La. Acts Nos. 709 and 711.
34. La. Civ. Code art. 155 reads in part: "Upon reconciliation of the spouses, the
community may be re-established by matrimonial agreement, as of the date of filing of
the original petition in the action in which the judgment was rendered."
It is significant that in spite of criticism of the requirement of a formal act
reestablishing the community which has resulted in apparent inequities where
the spouses were unaware of the requirement, the Legislature has not seen fit
to change the requirement. The requirement of a formal act was continued in
the comprehensive revision of marital laws by the provision of Article 155 that
the community may be reestablished by a matrimonial agreement, and the
provision of Article 2331 that a matrimonial agreement must be "an act under
private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses."
Freeman v. Freeman, 430 So. 2d 673, 676, n.l (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983), noted in 45
La. L. Rev. 163 (1984).
35. 1985 La. Acts No. 525.
36. Daggett, Suggestions for the Consideration of the Council of the Louisiana State
Law Institute, 5 La. L. Rev. 377, 395 (1943). The history of this proposal, as well as
that of article 155, is detailed in Note, Reconciliation Trap: Civil Code Article 155, 45
La. L. Rev. 163 (1984).
37. The only danger may be to those who are not aware of this effect of the
judgment of separation nor of the new remedy .... [They] may suffer the same
surprise and discomfort attendant upon the final discovery as has often been
the case in the past. Particularly is this true, of course, of the wife.
Daggett, Louisiana Legislation of 1944-Matters Pertaining to the Civil Code, 6 La. L.
Rev. 1, 3 (1944).
38. See La. Civ. Code art. 152; Moody v. Moody, 227 La. 134, 78 So. 2d 536
(1955); Reichert v. Lloveras, 188 La. 447, 177 So. 569 (1937). See also R. Pascal & K.
Spaht, supra note 1,at 172-73.
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layman might- assume, the community of acquets and gains was not

reestablished by the reconciliation. The illogic of the result has led one
author to describe the scenario as the "reconciliation trap."3 9
Recognition of the injustices created by article 155, which were
described in testimony before legislative committees, resulted in an
amendment which reestablishes the community as between the spouses

as of the date of reconciliation. Reconciliation requires proof of a mutual
intention to voluntarily resume the life in common." ° The existence of
this mutual intention is to be determined by all the factual circumstances,
sexual intercourse constituting strong evidence that the relationship has
been resumed. 4' Because mutual intention is proved by factual circumstances, the precise moment of reconciliation may be difficult to establish.

Although it may not be necessary in many cases to establish the
precise moment of reconciliation, there are two legal issues dependent
upon that determination: whether a matrimonial agreement to establish
a separation of property regime requires court approval and whether
the legislation applies to couples who reconciled before its effective date.
As to the first issue, the new legislation provides that should spouses
considering reconciliation desire to continue to live under a separation
of property regime, they may execute a matrimonial agreement prior to
reconciliation without court approval. In effect, the legal consequences
of a reconciliation upon the community have been reversed, the difference

being that couples who desire to maintain a separation of property
regime must execute an agreement to that effect. Those couples enjoy
a privilege that other married couples generally do not, the capacity to
execute a matrimonial agreement establishing a separation of property
regime without court approval. However, the "capacity" to contract

without court approval, which determines the validity of the matrimonial

39. Note, supra note 36.
40. Seymour v. Seymour, 423 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Jordan v. Jordan,
394 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Halverson v. Halverson, 365 So. 2d 600 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1978).
41. Hickman v. Hickman, 227 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). But see Levine
v. Levine, 373 So. 2d 1380 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), where the court concluded that
the husband and wife had reconciled although there had been no sexual intercourse:
After a two-week stay, he came back home and they reconciled to the extent
of sleeping in the same bed again, although they still did not have sexual
relations .... It is clear from the record that the parties had effected a reconciliation, even though they still were not having sexual relations. Arthur seems
to have accepted Renee's refusal of intercourse, at least insofar as he did not
raise it against her as a ground for separation. Renee clearly led Arthur to
understand, during the time he was away, that she agreed to his suggestion that
they try again when he returned.
Id.at 1383-84.
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agreement,4 2 is dependent upon establishing the moment of reconciliation.
The legislative assumption that the moment of reconciliation could
be established is even more important when considering the second issue,
whether the new legislation applies to couples judicially separated and
reconciled before the effective date of the amendment. If the legislature
assumed that reconciliation was a juridical act43 occurring at a fixed
moment rather than a continuing act, there is no legislative expression
that the new law applies to couples reconciled before the effective date
of the act. Absent that legislative direction, it can be argued that the
new legislation applies only to those couples whose reconciliation occurs
after September 6, 1985.44 It cannot be forcefully argued that the legislative change is merely procedural, thus applying retroactively absent a
declaration of legislative will to the contrary.4 5 The juridical act of

42. This "capacity" is even present where a:spouse legally separated from the other
spouse is contemplating reconciliation and subsequent to the agreement does not reconcile
with the other spouse. The term capacity is chosen by the author to describe the necessary
prerequisites to this agreement because if the spouses are reconciled when they execute
such an agreement, it is relatively null. The agreement executed by spouses during the
marriage to establish a separation of property regime requires court approval under Civil
Code article 2329 or it is null (La. Civ. Code art. 2029 (eff. Jan. 1, 1985)). Under La.
Civ. Code art. 2031 (eff. Jan. i, 1985):
A contract is relatively null when it violates a rule intended for the protection
of private parties, as when a party lacked capacity or did not give free consent
at the time the contract was made. A contract that is only relatively null may
be confirmed.
Relative nullity may be invoked only by those persons for whose interest the
ground for nullity was established, and may not be declared by the court on
its own initiative.
43. "Those acts which are performed solely in order.to bring about one or several
legal effects are called juridical acts. They are said to be juridical on account of the
nature of their effects." I M. Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil, No. 265, at
187 (12th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959). "To perform a juridical act, there must be,
in principle, at least two persons. The reason for this is that most juridical acts are
contracts, that is to say, a meeting of minds between two or more persons." Id. Nos.
267-269, at 189. However, despite the possibility of considering reconciliation as a juridical
act under Planiol's definition, it could be argued that reconciliation results from the
relationship of the parties, not from the uniting of their wills with the intention of
producing an act with legal effects. "Relationship, which is a natural fact, confers different
rights, such as the right of succession. And it imposes burdens, such as the duty to
provide alimony." Id. No. 265, at 188.
44. La. Civ. Code art. 8, interpreted and applied in Tullier v. Tullier, 464 So. 2d
278 (La. 1985); Spragio v. Board of Trustees of State Employees Group Benefits Program,
468 So. 2d 1323 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); and Graham v. Sequoya Corp., 468 So. 2d
849 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985). See also La. R.S. 1:2 (1973); Johnson, Developments in
the Law 1983-1984-Legislation, 45 La. L. Rev. 341 (1984).
45. Wall v. Close, 201 La. 986, 10 So. 2d 779 (1943); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber
Co. v. Wilson, 195 La. 814, 197 So. 566 (1940); State v. Bezett, 158 La. 309, 104 So.
55 (1925); Johnson v. Fournet, 387 So. 2d 1336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Manuel v.
Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1962).
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reconciliation has legal effects which concern substantive rights-ownership of property. 46 Planiol, when considering the retroactivity problem
as it affects juridical acts, stated that "[j]uridical acts . . . usually require
for their performance but a very short space of time. They take place
entirely during the duration of a single law. They should be governed
4 7'
exclusively by the law in force at the moment they occur."
However, should reconciliation be considered a continuing series of
acts, it can be argued that the statute is not retroactive merely because
it operates upon antecedent, present, and future facts.48 A similar conclusion has been reached in instances where the legislature has enacted
new grounds for divorce. For example, in Hurry v. Hurry"9 the court
permitted a spouse to obtain relief under new legislation which provided
that a divorce could be obtained where the parties lived separate and
apart for seven years.5 0 The parties had lived separate and apart for
twelve years at the time suit was filed, but the years had elapsed before
the effective date of the new legislation. In his treatise on French law,
Planiol described such circumstances as follows:
A law may modify the future effects of acts or even of acts
prior to it, without being retroactive." [I]f the intervention of
a court is necessary to bring about a new juridical situation (for
example, divorce or separation of property) there will be no
retroactivity and the court will apply the law in force at the
2
time judgment is pronounced.1

46. In Rico v. Vangundy, 461 So. 2d 458, 462 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984), the court
described a vested right as one where:
[Al right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of
some particular person or persons as a present interest. The right must be
absolute, complete and unconditional, independent of a contingency, and a mere
expectancy of future benefit or contingent interest in property... does not
constitute a vested right. Tennant v. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 39 So. 2d 726, 728
(1949); Draughn v. Mart., 411 So. 2d 1188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
47. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 43, No. 245, at 175:
All that touches upon either the conditions of validity, the forms or the means
of proof of a juridical act, is to be dealt with solely according to the law in
force the day it took place and not according to subsequent laws. It would be
altogether unjust to blame the parties for not having respected a law not yet
in existence. ...
48. State v. Alden Mills, 202 La. 416, 12 So. 2d 204 (1943); Henry v. Jean, 115
So. 2d 363 (La. 1959); Churchill Farms, Inc. v. La. Tax Comm'n, 338 So. 2d 963 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1976); Louisiana Ins. Guaranty Ass'n v. Guglielmo, 276 So. 2d 720 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 279 So. 2d 690 (La. 1973).
49. 141 La. 954, 76 So. 160 (1917). See also Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488, 148
So. 687 (1933); Mason v. Mason, 399 So. 2d 1272 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
50. 1916 La. Acts No. 269.
51. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 43, No. 243, at 174-75.
52. Id. No. 243A, at 175.
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The distinction between reconciliation as a continuing act and cases
such as Hurry lies in the fact that the act of reconciliation has legal
consequences without the intervention of the judicial system. The legal
consequences attach at the moment of reconciliation, creating substantial'
property rights, not mere expectancies. If one does not characterize
reconciliation as a continuing act, one avoids the difficult legal questions

posed where the initial reconciliation (if a series of continuing acts)
occurred before the effective, date of the amendment to article 155. For
example, should situations where neither spouse was aware a matrimonial
agreement was necessary to reestablish the community regime be distin-

guished from those where one spouse was aware but the other was not,
or where both spouses. verbally agreed not to execute a matrimonial
53
agreement but continue to live, under a separate property regime?
The issue of retroactivity of the new legislation- will ordinarily arise
in a contest between the spouses incident to a divorce action where a
partition of "community property" is sought. The reconciliation, if
proved and if it occurred after September 6, 1985, only affects the
characterization of the property as between the spouses.
For the reestablishment of the community to have effect as to third
parties' i.e. creditors and third party purchasers, notice that the com-

munity has been reestablished must be filed in the conveyance records
of the parish where immovable property is situated to affect immovables
and in the conveyance records of the parish where the spouses are
domiciled 4 to affect movable property." The legislation neither prescribes

53. The same problems would arise should a court consider the new legislation
retroactive, even if not made expressly so by legislative direction. It could be argued that
the Legislature impliedly intended' to make the legislation retroactive by taking into
consideration the testimony elicited before the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure and the Senate Committee on Judiciary A. Nothing in either the state or federal
constitutions prohibits explicitly retroactive laws. The basic approach in-examining the
constitutionality of a retroactive law has been first to consider whether the law was
unreasonable. In the past the factors identified as important in determining whether a
law was unreasonable were: (1) the nature and strength of the public interest served by
the: law, (2) the extent the law abrogates prior rights, and (3) the nature of the prior
rights abrogated. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the- Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692 (1960). Recently, however, the analysis has been
simplified. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Gray and Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984).
For an excellent discussion of the retroactivity of legislation and constitutional guarantees in the context of community property legislation see generally Samuel, The Retroactivity Provisions of Louisiana's Equal Management Law: Interpretation and
Constitutionality, 39 La. L. Rev. 347 (1979). See also Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 216 (1960).
54. Comment (b) to La. Civ. Code art. 2332 suggested that the spouses might have
different domiciles, a proposition which, of course, is now permitted under 1985 La. Acts
Nos. 271-72. See discussion in text at notes 1-34.
55. La. Civ. Code art. 2332.
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a particular form for the notice nor refers specifically to the unilateral
character of the notice. There is no doubt that the notice may be filed
by either spouse, in contrast to the prior law which required the consent

of both spouses expressed in a matrimonial agreement. As a unilateral
act with important community property consequences, it is analogous

to the unilateral reservation of natural and civil fruits of separate property.16 The significant difference, however, is that the unilateral notice
of reestablishment requires a reconciliation of the spouses, whereas the
unilateral reservation of fruits of separate property is a right that can
be exercised by a spouse at any time.

Consider a husband who purchases immovable property with earnings
acquired after a judgment of separation from bed and board. A third
party, interested in purchasing the property, approaches the husband.

The wife files a notice of reestablishment of the community although
there has been no reconciliation factually under the jurisprudence. The
wife may know there has been no reconciliation and choose to file the

notice of reestablishment to harrass the husband, or she may genuinely
believe there has been a reconciliation. Third persons who validly acquired rights prior to filing of the notice are protected from the retroactive effect of the reconciliation,57 but the third party in our

hypothetical situation did not. If there has been a reconciliation, the
husband's earnings are retroactively reclassified as community property,"
and thus the property purchased with those funds is also community
property. 9 The wife's concurrence is required for the alienation of

community immovable property absent a declaration in the act of acquisition that the husband was acquiring the property with separate
property for his separate estate. 60 The husband must file suit seeking a
mandatory injunction against the wife6 1 and, at the hearing, offer proof

56.

La. Civ. Code art. 2339.

57. La. Civ. Code art. 155 (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 525): "The reestablishment of the community shall not prejudice the rights of third persons validly acquired
prior to filing notice of the reestablishment nor shall it affect a prior community property
partition between the spouses."
58. La. Civ. Code art. 2338.
59. Id.
60. La. Civ. Code art. 2342, para. 2. However, the wife may controvert the declaration
in the act of acquisition if she did not concur in the act and if the property is still
owned and unencumbered by the husband.
61. Under La. R.S. 9:291 (eff. Jan. 1, 1980), the spouses, if judicially separated,
are not precluded from suing each other. This assumes the permissibility of filing suit
utilizing the "unless judicially separated" language until the other spouse can prove a
reconciliation occurred. The suit instituted by the husband would be analogous to a suit
to cancel a mortgage. See also La. Civ. Code arts. 3372 and 3373. After a mandatory
injunction is obtained by the husband, he could seek relief against the Clerk of Court
by a writ of mandamus. See Billot v. Sea Life, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1023 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1980).
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that there has been no reconciliation. If he is successful, his remedy
for the wrongful filing is damages, including the costs of filing suit to
enjoin.
The opportunity provided by the new legislation to file a unilateral
notice of reestablishment of the community in bad faith, when weighed
against the old legislation's unacceptable alternative requiring an agreement executed by both spouses, seems the lesser evil.

